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Recidivism and the Convict Labor Market 
What’s the Problem? 
For-profit prisons face a conflict of interests. Their goals as social rehabilitators, reducing 
crime and recidivism, directly interfere with their goals as profit-seekers, increasing the number 
of prisons and prisoners they own (Mendez, 2012). As the incarcerated population grows, the 
number of prisons required to house it increases. Government contracts to build and operate 
prisons are sold, and the prison system receives inexpensive workers. By allowing private 
interests to determine the living and working conditions of prisoners, who are legal property of 
their state, we open prisoners to two major issues: maltreatment while under prison care and poor 
reintegration into the civilian world after incarceration. In both instances, it is never in the 
private corporations’ interest to do more than what is both legally required and accurately 
monitored. This incentive can drive them to “cut corners, leading to unsafe conditions” for 
prisoners and prison staff (Russell, 2012). In the case of reintegration, for-profit prisons benefit 
from recidivist criminal activity. They receive both a per diem payment for housing criminals 
and the product of prisoners’ labor while they are incarcerated. 
Additionally, the close ties between private prisons and government officials can lead to 
illegitimate lobbying efforts designed to increase the incarceration rate. Because “the number of 
prisoners in [the U.S.] has always increased to fill available prison space, even as crime rates 
decline,” these efforts have succeeded in the United States (Antonuccio, 2008). Regardless of 
legality, their efforts measurably raise incarceration rates beyond their natural level and increase 
revenue to private corporations who house criminals. Brickner and Diaz (2011) provide a few 
examples of this corruption. Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judge Mark Ciavarella was “paid by 
private prison officials to sentence kids to harsher punishments in order to keep the company's 
 
 
private facility filled” (Brickner & Diaz, 2011). Governor Jan Brewer was “connected with 
lobbyists for private prisons… Brewer came under fire after signing S. 1070, which... likely 
would have allowed private companies to increase detention of undocumented immigrants in the 
state” (Brickner & Diaz, 2011). These examples need little explanation for one to understand the 
political influence private prisons possess. The perpetual growth of for-profit prisons is the 
driving factor behind increased incarceration and re-incarceration rates as a result of the system’s 
financial incentive to keep prisoners behind bars. 
The Topic: 
Studying the relationship between re-incarceration rates of industrialized and post-
industrial nations and whether or not they employ penal labor in for-profit prisons. We expect 
nations who employ prisoners’ labor in private and government facilities to re-incarcerate more 
of their criminals in order to increase revenue in the for-profit prison industry. 
Purpose: 
Determining the effects of profit-seeking agencies on re-incarceration rates of convicted 
criminals. This study focuses on re-incarceration rather than incarceration or crime rates in order 
to measure the effect for-profit prisons have on their prisoners, which cannot be measured from 
first time offenders who have not yet been imprisoned. Do prison labor and the for-profit prison 
industry increase criminal recidivism? 
Null and Alternative Hypotheses: 
H0: Countries that employ prison labor do not have significantly higher re-incarceration rates 
than countries that don’t. B1* Prison Labor = 0 
H1: Countries that employ prison labor have significantly higher re-incarceration rates than 
countries that don’t. B1* Prison Labor > 0 
 
 
 
Data and Methodology 
The re-incarceration rate is the 3 year rate of re-imprisonment in a cohort of released 
prisoners in a given year and the dependent variable our model predicts. The recidivism data 
come from the various Ministries of Justice and Criminology Departments of the United States, 
United Kingdom, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Scotland, Ireland, and Spain, as well as The Laogai Research Foundation 
from 1994-2011. For countries with multiple studies in this time period, the average of their 
findings is taken for its recidivism rate. The variation in criminal recidivism over time in the 10 
countries that recorded in multiple years was significantly smaller than the variation between 
nations themselves. The largest standard error, found in the United States, was 4.4 percentage 
points compared to 9.3 percentage points between all 18 nations. 
Similarly, the variation in crimes of assault (2003-2011), burglary (2003-2011), drug 
possession and sale (2003-2008), homicide (1995-2011), robbery (2003-2011), theft (2003-
2011), and sexual violence (2003-2011) were substantially smaller over their respective periods 
in any nation from our study than between the nations themselves (United Nations, 2013). 
Although the data do not represent a perfect cross-section, we can make relevant cross-country 
comparisons based on the assumption that both crime and recidivism, which is the crime rate 
among formerly convicted criminals, trends change very little over the course of a single 
generation of criminals.  
For some countries, only reconviction data are available. Reconviction rates are 
necessarily higher than re-incarceration rates simply by definition. The United Nation’s 
“International Statistics on Justice and Crime” defines the punitivity ratio of a nation as its 
sentenced incarcerated persons per persons convicted of a crime by a judicial body (Harrendorf 
 
 
et al., 2010). Although, as the report concedes, some nations in this study were obviously subject 
to underreporting issues in one or both of these rates. Because several of the nations in our study 
were obviously underreporting, we use the mean punitivity ratio to approximate re-incarceration 
from reconviction. Taken together, their mean punitivity ratio was .93 (Harrendorf et al., 2010). 
This does not produce any alarming results or significant changes in our recidivism data. 
Prison labor is a dummy variable. Nations who employ convicted criminals in low-skilled 
or hard labor receive a 1; all others receive a 0. The United States, United Kingdom, China, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand all employ prison labor in for-profit prisons. 
Police officers, judges, prison staff, and prosecutors per general population as well as 
persons prosecuted per prosecutor, persons convicted per prosecutor, and persons suspected of a 
crime per police officer serve as control variables for the size and productivity, but not quality, of 
the police, penal, and legal staff. Persons convicted per prosecutor is especially useful because 
“conviction is located at the end of the criminal justice process of first instance, [and thus] the 
differences of the legal systems are fully pronounced here,” (Harrendorf et al., 2010). Simply 
put, the conviction of guilty criminals is analogous to the final product of the legal process and 
the best indicator of the prosecutors’ productivity. However, none of these variables added 
predictive power to our recidivism model. This result simply indicates that, on average, law 
enforcement and prison staff do not substantially influence criminal recidivism within their range 
of sizes in these nations. 
Organized criminal activity represents a special type of “professional” crime. 
Presumably, to join a criminal organization, a person would need skills and experience 
committing crimes in order to be considered an asset. Additionally, organized criminals are 
almost certainly likely to return to their primary source of income after release due to their 
 
 
dismal prospects in the legal job market. Thus, we expect all members of a criminal organization 
to be recidivist criminals, but with only some being caught and successfully prosecuted. Jan Vin 
Dijk estimates the prevalence of organized crime in a nation based on organized crime 
perception, informal sector (or black market operations), unsolved homicides, high level 
corruption, and money laundering in “Mafia markers: assessing organized crime and its impact 
upon societies” (Van Dijk, 2007). Van Dijk found that the organized crime rate was uncorrelated 
with the general crime rate, and the organized crime index did not add predictive power to our 
recidivism model. 
Immigrants are more exploitable in any nation because they do not possess the same 
rights as citizens. In the United States and United Kingdom, illegal immigrants are often detained 
in private prisons, and private prisons are “successfully pushing policies that would allow prison 
laborers to replace immigrant farm workers” (Mendez & Intern, 2012). Additionally “immigrants 
detained in private facilities in the U.K. are being funneled through the prison labor scheme to 
work for the benefit of the prison and the private employer” (Mendez & Intern, 2012). For these 
reasons, we may expect countries with a higher immigrant population to also be more likely to 
incarcerate those immigrants. We use the immigrant population as measured by the “United 
Nations: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision” (United Nations, 2013).  
However, immigrant population was predictive of neither re-incarceration nor penal labor 
employment. 
We use the Gini Index of wealth distribution as measured by the World Bank to 
determine wealth disparity. In nations with high wealth disparity, criminals have relatively more 
to gain from property crimes like theft and burglary. Within these 18 nations, there is a non-
negligible correlation between Gini index and crimes of burglary (r^2 = .53) and theft (r^2 = 
 
 
.44). Given that these crimes have over 70% recidivism in the United States, and most likely 
elsewhere, we may expect nations with more wealth disparity to have greater general recidivism 
(Durose et al., 2014). However, wealth disparity added no predictive power to the recidivism 
model. 
Results and Explanations 
Model:  
Re-incarceration Rate = 31.2 + 14.3*(Prison Labor Employment) + u 
Residuals     
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-10.364 -5.377 -0.039 4.123 12.636 
Coefficients     
     
 Estimate Std. Error T Statistic Pr > t 
Intercept 31.2 1.88 16.59 1.66 e-11 
Prison Labor 14.3 2.82 5.07 0.000114 
Residual Std. Error 5.946 on 16 DF    
Multiple R-Squared 0.6164    
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5924    
F-statistic 25.71 on 1 and 16 DF    
p-value 0.0001136    
(Ahven 2010). (Armstrong & Barton, 2012). (Capdevila & Puig, 2009). (Department of Justice and Equity, 2001). (Department 
of Justice and Equity, 2005). (Department of Justice and Equity, 2010). (Department of Justice and Equity, 2011). (Department of 
Justice: Statistics and Research Branch, 2011). (Drabsch, 2006). (Graunbøl et al., 2010). (Irish Prison Service, 2013). (Jones et 
al., 2006). (Langan & Levin, 2002). (Ministère de la Justice-Secrétariat general, 2013). (Ministry of Justice Bulletin, 2013). 
(Nadesu, 2007). (Nadesu, 2008). (O et al., 2008). (Payne, 2007). (Pew Center on the States, 2011). (The Probation Service, 
2012). (Reina et al., 2004). (Spier, 2001). (Spier, 2002). (Wartna et al., 2010). (Wartna et al., 2011). (Wartna et al., 2012). 
Prison labor is the only variable that adds significant predictive power to the recidivism model. 
An adjusted R-squared of .59 indicates a strong positive correlation between employing 
prisoners for labor and their likelihood of recidivating. This correlational result by itself cannot 
 
 
prove or even indicate that for-profit prisons cause an increase criminal recidivism. Perhaps for-
profit prison industries are simply more likely to arise in nations with a large population of 
recidivist criminals, or both of these factors are caused by another variable not included in our 
model. However, the results support the causal conclusion found in Bayer and Pozen’s (2005) 
“The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public versus Private Management,” 
which found a statistically significant increase in recidivism caused by for-profit prison 
management. 
Previous Findings on Recidivism and Prison Privatization 
Bayer and Pozen’s (2005) results indicated a 5% to 8% increase in 1 year recidivism rates 
and 13% to 19% increase in daily hazards in for-profit prisons compared to non-profit private, 
county, and state prisons in a cohort of Florida juvenile offenders. The results are significant 
even after adjusting for socioeconomic and regional factors, prison size, and type of criminal 
offence. 
For-profit prisons outperformed non-profit and state prisons in costs, spending $6,000 
and $11,500 less per prisoner respectively. The cost reductions in for-profit prisons, however, do 
not account for the social and economic costs associated with recidivist criminal activity or 
imprisoning and housing the recidivist criminal. County prisons had both the lowest cost per 
prisoner and lowest recidivism rates for certain types of crime. Additionally, county and for-
profit prisons tended to be larger than state and non-profit, so scale economies may explain some 
of the cost difference (Bayer & Pozen, 2005). Some of the cost reduction in private prisons can 
be accounted for by security personnel wage differences. Public guards earn a 15% wage 
premium over private, are more likely to be unionized, and generally perform higher quality 
work in terms of reducing recidivism, escapes, and inter-prison violence (Donahue, 1988). 
 
 
Additionally, public prisons have more experienced guards than private because of their lower 
turnover rates, 16% in public compared to 53% in private (Brickner & Diaz,2011). Private 
prisons are motivated by profits and not social welfare, leading to lower quality treatment and 
higher re-incarceration rates for their prisoners. 
Conclusion 
 Our correlational results support the causal conclusion found by Bayer and Pozen. 
Nations who allow for-profit prisons to employ and incarcerate prisoners have higher criminal 
recidivism than nations who don’t. Although this correlational study cannot calculate the causal 
impact of prison labor on recidivism because other unobserved differences between nations may 
affect re-incarceration, Bayer and Pozen’s results indicate that, ceteris paribus, for-profit prisons 
increase recidivism in their prisoners compared to non-profit prisons. Therefore, the policy 
recommendations are the same. Replace for-profit prison management with state and local 
management and disallow future government contracts for private prisons. Private prison 
corporations have little vested interest in the welfare of their prisoners or the communities in 
which they are located compared to publicly managed facilities. They do not face the financial 
and social repercussions if their prisoners recidivate and benefit if that prisoner is re-incarcerated 
in the private prison system. State and local prisons would be much more accountable given the 
greater degree of government oversight and lesser degree of profit-seeking. 
  
 
 
Appendix A 
Results for other tested variables: 
 Estimate Std. Error T-statistic Pr > T 
Persons convicted per prosecutor 0.00152 0.0103 0.148 0.88628 
Persons prosecuted per prosecutor 0.00359 0.006905 0.52 0.6156 
Persons suspected of a crime per 
police officer 0.09274 0.14451 0.642 0.5355 
Police officers per person  0.0239 0.01929 1.239 0.239025 
Prosecutors per person  0.2368 0.4346 0.545 0.59576 
Professional judges per person  -0.1815 0.3941 -0.461 0.65272 
Prison Staff per person 0.02404 0.04414 0.545 0.59684 
Composite Organized Crime Index -0.0226 0.1154 -0.196 0.847956 
Immigrants 0.04994 0.2767 0.18 0.859357 
Assault 0.004471 0.003943 1.134 0.27734 
Burglary -0.001322 0.003941 -0.336 0.74259 
Drug crime -0.005419 0.005474 -0.99 0.340252 
Homicide 1.126 1.319 0.853 0.406895 
Robbery 0.002849 0.006304 0.452 0.6587 
Sexual violence -0.005841 0.00868 -0.673 0.51374 
Theft -0.0006093 0.0014045 -0.434 0.67153 
Wealth Gini -13.675 18.667 -0.733 0.47512 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Summary of the Literature on Convict Labor: 
United States of America: 
At the beginning of the Reconstruction era in the American South, police began targeting 
freed African Americans for violations of the newly passed curfew, anti-loitering, and anti-
vagrancy laws (Smith & Hattery, 2008). Because few newly freed African Americans owned 
land, they were easy targets for arrest. The African American crime rate skyrocketed, surpassing 
the crime rates of Caucasian Americans, and remains disproportionately high today (Smith & 
Hattery, 2008). The convict lease system took off with this new, large pool of labor. Convict 
labor was rented out to many of the slave-driven industries of the pre-Civil War era like 
plantation farming, coal mining, and textile production (Smith & Hattery, 2008). More recently, 
their labor has been rented out to multinational corporations, such Microsoft to Victoria’s Secret, 
for a myriad of tasks such as data entry, factory production, and telemarketing (Smith & Hattery, 
2008). Prison labor was explicitly made legal by the 13th amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
which outlaws slavery “except as a punishment for crime.” For these reasons, many consider the 
convict labor system to be a continuation of slavery. 
The Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) was established under President Franklin D 
Roosevelt in 1934. UNICOR runs and regulates 109 factories housing more than 22,000 federal 
prisoners. They generated $765 million in sales in 2008 and are projected to receive $2.7 million 
in government funding in fiscal year 2014. UNICOR’s sales are restricted to federal agencies, 
meaning that they cannot compete with private contractors on any private contracts. Federal 
agencies, except for the Department of Defense, are required to purchase goods through 
UNICOR when available unless UNICOR authorizes the sale from a private contractor (James, 
 
 
2007). Inmates employed by FPI receive wages from $0.23/hour to $1.15/hour (James, 2007). 
50% of their wages may be garnished to pay for various legal and penal fees, such as court-
ordered fines and child support payments (James, 2007). 
In 2011, there were 176,228 prisoners housed in federal facilities and 29,776 in private 
for a total of 206,004 (Department of Justice, 2011). All of these prisoners were used for labor if 
they were physically able. By law, they must work or be dealt punishment (James, 2011). 
People’s Republic of China: 
China’s reported recidivism rates are extremely low (Deng et al., 1998). While not a 
single nation reported a recidivism rate below 20% for any year, China reported near single digit 
re-incarceration rates in multiple years (Tongzhi, 2008). These rates are not only remarkable; 
they are highly suspicious. The controversial Laogai and their questionable methods of 
incarcerating individuals may explain China’s reports of low recidivism. The Laogai or “reform 
through labor” is a system of labor camps located throughout China which has detained 
approximately 50 million prisoners in the past 50 years, many of them political dissidents, with 
an estimated 10 million prisoners being held in 1993 (Wu, 1993). Prisoners are frequently 
worked for up to 16 hours a day in production and public works projects and medically and 
nutritionally neglected (Wu, 1995). Additionally, some prisoners’ organs are sold to important 
Chinese politicians and foreign buyers (Wu, 1995). According to the The Laogai Research 
Foundation, there are an estimated 3,000 Laogai camps (Wu, 1993). They have identified 1,100 
Laogai camps since LRF’s founding 21 years ago (Wu, 1996). The Laogai has come under fire 
both internally and internationally for its many human rights violations and is by far the most 
pervasive penal labor system in this study. Due to the secretive nature of these camps, finding 
data on the Laogai is difficult. 
 
 
Harry Wu, a former Laogai prisoner of 19 years and the founder of the The Laogai 
Research Foundation, is one of the few sources of information. Wu and the LRF, who have 
appeared before Congress to testify on the Laogai, describe in great detail and with video 
evidence the harsh conditions in the camps, from 16 hour work days to human organs marketing 
and murder (Wu, 1995). Because of the difficulties in acquiring complete data, all data presented 
on the Laogai are approximations which most likely understate the true total, according to Wu. 
Laojiao or “re-education through labor” is a separate faction of the Laogai. It is generally 
used as punishment for petty criminals, unemployed vagrants, and political dissidents (Wu 
1993). Unlike the Laogai, Laojiao isn’t handled as a criminal offense. Persons need not pass 
through judicial procedures to be sent to a Laojiao and are not counted in the prison population, 
crime rate, or recidivism rate (Wu, 1993). Instead, police discretion determines who is sent to 
Laojiao. The sentences to Laojiao are shorter than those of Laogai, usually lasting 3 years or less 
with the possibility of having a fourth year added (The Laogai Research Foundation, 2006). 
Currently, there are 346 identified Laojiao camps, all of which employ penal labor similar to 
other Laogai camps (The Laogai Research Foundation, 2006). 
Jiuye or “forced job placement” extends a prisoner’s term beyond its court appointed 
limit. It is a prison sentence of indefinite length designed to keep Laogai prisoners in servitude at 
“30-60% the wage of a general worker” (Wu, 1993). Although this sentence does not require 
people to commit another crime, it re-imprisons convicts in the Laogai and should be counted 
towards the re-incarceration rate of China. There are presently “16-20 million inmates, of whom 
4.6 million are arrested and sentenced criminals, 3 to 5 million are labor re-education prisoners, 
and 8 to 10 million are Forced Job Placement personnel” (Wu & Slingerland, 1992). Taking the 
most conservative estimates, 8 million of the 16 million inmates received a sentence to Jiuye.  
 
 
Because a Jiuye sentence is a subsequent prison sentence, despite the fact that prisoners 
need not commit another crime to receive it, we must consider the population of prisoners who 
receive Jiuye sentences as re-incarcerated, especially if we want to measure the increase in re-
incarceration caused by China’s Laogai. We exclude China’s own reported rates because they 
fail to capture this population. Taking the most conservative estimates of each of these 
populations, we find 8 million of the 16 million prisoners received Jiuye sentences, or 50%. This 
will serve as China’s current re-incarceration rate. 
United Kingdom: 
 The Ministry of Justice supports the movement towards 40 hour work week for prisoners. 
Private prison companies, most notably G4S, control about 12% of the prison population in the 
UK. G4S employs prisoners in industries like metal-working and digital marketing and is the 
second-largest commercial employer in the world after Walmart. According their website they 
have spent “over a decade... working with a number of employers at our prisons, such as Summit 
Media at HMP Wolds and Norpro at HMP Altcourse, who have been able to benefit 
commercially from secure, modern premises, a committed workforce and low overheads” 
(Working prisons: Working people, 2011). Although prisoners’ wages are never mentioned, 
G4S’s claim “work which used to be produced India has now been brought back to the UK” 
indicates they spend very little on labor costs (Working prisons: Working people, 2011). They 
have had both successes and failures with ingratiating themselves with businesses. According to 
their own study, “over two fifths of managers (43%) said their company would never be prepared 
to work within or with a prison” (Working prisons: Working people, 2011). 
Japan: 
 In Japan, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) handles convict laborers. Prisoners typically 
 
 
work 8 hours a day, Monday-Friday (J@pan Inc., 2002). They receive 4.5 Yen/hour 
(~$0.05/hour) as a starting wage and can make up to 34.7 Yen/hour (~$0.34/hour). The system 
seems to have gained acceptance among the Japanese government mainstream society as 
corrective rather than exploitive (Johnson, 1996). Their bicameral legislature substantially 
increased the number of industries PFI businesses were allowed to operate in through the 
Amendment to the Law of Private Finance Initiative (Banking and Finance, 2011). Furthermore, 
the Japanese government annually announces their PFI projects, allowing private businesses to 
adapt their behavior (Banking and Finance, 2011). 
New Zealand: 
Prime Minister John Key fully supports expanding the number of working prisons in 
New Zealand and requiring unpaid 40 hour work weeks for prisoners, citing reducing 
reoffending as his goal (Chris, 2010). Currently, New Zealand has only 3 working prisons, 
Rolleston, Auckland Women’s, and Tongariro/Rangipo Prisons that employ 1400 prisoners for 
labor. The Corrections Contract Management of Prisons Act 2009 allows prisoners to be used 
“for the public good” in cooperation with private enterprises (Davison, 2013). Previously, it was 
only the state which had the power to use prisoners for labor (Davison, 2013). 
Australia: 
The Department of Correctional Services in South Australia employs prisoners in textile 
work and production, welding and fabrication, powder coating, and furniture manufacture among 
other industries (Department for Correctional Services, 2010). Alice Springs Correctional Center 
recently began using inmate labor in salt mines. Prisoners earn $60 a week after deductions 
(Department for Correctional Services 2010). 
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